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Nowadays, the old ideology, which was vigorously discussed by the public opinion of the country one and a half decades ago, has already been partially forgotten. It is about the enlightened authoritarianism, which was first mentioned by, if my memory serves right, French politician and political analyst Alex Moskovich, the external adviser of Nursultan Nazarbaev. At the time critics condemned authoritarianism, but the second part of the equation, without which it did not hold a meaning, was left outside of the discussion.
Kazakhstan cannot afford to have a weak power structure. Strong presidential control cements the borders and territorial integrity of the country; it balances the complex national composition of the population, as well as the appetites of the regional, the financial and the traditional elites, and acts as an arbiter in all external and internal disputes. Strong governance pushes political, national, and religious radicalism from the socio-political field. Strong governance consolidates both the elite and the nation during crises. Strong governance ensures the relatively balanced development of all regions and social groups. A strong governance can ensure the implementation of reforms, which sometimes could be painful, but are necessary for the future of the country.
Everyone knows all the risks that generate within and outside the borders. Aside from geopolitics (oil and geography), Kazakhstani society is regularly developing a certain set of problems that once had escaped to the surface in many neighboring countries and still contribute to their permanent destabilization.
I remember, for almost a decade and a half, one respected expert, in the traditional New Year’s poll in the media, every year predicted the collapse of the country, the collapse of the economy, the beginning of the civil war. Every year and every decade since those predictions did not come true.
The country did not have any ethnic conflicts in their pure form. Almost all of the incidents were quasi-criminal, quasi-economic, and simultaneously local in their nature. An insignificant number of terrorist acts were rather spontaneous actions, since domestic intelligence services identified and stopped everything that was more or less organized in nature.
Government institutions, despite all the criticism against them, a high level of corruption, and a low level of efficiency, continue to function, although not as well as we would like. And the economy, which has experienced many internal and external crises over the years of independence, is functioning and even developing, sometimes even contrary to some of the state programs. Of course, a lot could be done better, but knowing the staff and their motivation, one can safely state that it could have been worse.
This is likely the phenomenon of enlightened authoritarianism. Power officials — no, not even that — but directly the first president of Kazakhstan was able to build the institutions of an independent state, attain its global recognition, resist long three decades against radicals and extremists, and ensure the transition from one economic formation to another, mitigating the social risks as much as possible.
It is easy to critique much of what has been done from today’s perspective, however, few remember, and few try to understand, what the country has been through, especially in the 1990s.
Nazarbaev has maintained peace and stability in Kazakhstan, and this alone should be enough to be remembered in history. The power structures were ahead in both ideological and economic discourses. The first president was looking for new ways of development and eagerly invited new people from science, business, the regions, and went to rejuvenate the government. We often talked about the same personnel card deck, which Nazarbayev constantly shuffled, about the old guard, which supposedly held the defense firmly and did not let the youth in.
As an example, let's look at the rating of the most influential people in the country at the beginning of 2019 (study done by the Strategy Center). Out of the first twenty, only two held major positions at the start of the country’s independence: former chairman of the Almaty regional council Esimov and former past chairman of the State Committee for Youth Affairs Tasmagambetov. Masimov was then a chief specialist of the Ministry of Labor, Kulibaev was the Director of the Scientific Advisory Center; Isekeshev, Baibek, Bisimbaev and Dosaev were students, Nigmatulin was a chairman of the Committee of Youth Organizations, Kozhamzharov was an investigator, Tokaev was the First Secretary of the Embassy of USSR in China, Sagintaev was a lecturer, Mamin – the Deputy Director of the Union of Innovative Enterprises, Zhumagaliev was a cadet; Utemuratov was the head of Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations Department; Shpekbaev was the head of District Department of Internal Affairs, Shukeev was a graduate student, Asanov was the assistant of the District Attorney. They all became ministers, oligarchs and generals in the new era. Elite was always changing, always.
Of course, we can criticize the first president. He is, after all, a human, and has made some mistakes that later had to be fixed. However, one does not remember an existence of a textbook for presidents of Kazakhstan on how to build an independent country, transition to a capitalist system and maintain ethnic harmony. A funny but characteristic fact: two people who at different times called themselves the main opponents of Nazarbayev and long fled the country, are still sitting in exile, because they know that they do not have any social base in the country and that the people will not follow them.
Here I would like to mention the rotation of power, which is periodically called the main panacea from all political problems. Maybe somewhere such a political model is effective (or was effective), but it is important to remember that not a single figure has emerged outside the power vertical that could claim to be the real political alternative to Nazarbayev. The influx of the opposition came mainly from the government, and officials left very little because of the ideological disagreements, but because of defeats in the apparatus wars. They left, returned, and left once again. No one had become a real plausible alternative. In some way, the reason was a light corruption trail that followed many former government officials, and many current ones. Unfortunately, corruption risks greatly undermining the moral authority of the ruling elite.
Thirty years ago Nazarbayev said: «People in power, because of the deeply rooted cult of personality, least of all thought about preparing worthy successors; on the contrary, they had prevented the growth of influence of those in whom they saw as potential rivals, a threat to their sole rule. This should be a serious lesson for us for the future.» I would like to draw attention to this quote. Of course, one would like to show Nazarbaev’s quote to Nazarbaev himself, but let’s be honest, the first president knew all of the government officials too well and had continuously studied and tested his companions in various forms. Not all had passed the test.
In recent years it has been talked about that the first president will cede power to one of his relative’s. However, Nazarbayev, though periodically nominating some of them for different government positions, consciously did not let any of them to have any necessary experience of managing the country. On the contrary, as soon as someone grew ambitious, immediately followed a resignation. The first president ruled out the possibility of succession of the presidency, although at times he used these conversations in political maneuvers.
Power according to Nazarbayev’s formula, which could be deduced from his personnel policy, should be given to a man who could be both a strong and a smart president, and, last but not least, with a spotless reputation.
The matter is not about the public approval in the elections, but rather it is about how an enlightened authoritarianism, as a form of ruling that ensures peace, stability, and progress, should be ensured, first of all, by the moral authority of the head of state.
Daniyar Ashimbaev
Political scientist, leading researcher at the Institute for Security and Cooperation in Central Asia
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